SHOULD PERSONAL INFORMATION AND BIOMETRIC DATA BE PROTECTED UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL PRIVACY STATUTE THAT USES THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT AND THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT AS MODEL LAWS? by Buresh, Donald L.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal 
Volume 38 Issue 1 Article 2 
2021 
SHOULD PERSONAL INFORMATION AND BIOMETRIC DATA BE 
PROTECTED UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL PRIVACY 
STATUTE THAT USES THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY 
ACT AND THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT 
AS MODEL LAWS? 
Buresh, Donald L. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Buresh, Donald L., SHOULD PERSONAL INFORMATION AND BIOMETRIC DATA BE PROTECTED UNDER A 
COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL PRIVACY STATUTE THAT USES THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT 
AND THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT AS MODEL LAWS?, 38 SANTA CLARA HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 39 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol38/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com. 
 
 39 
SHOULD PERSONAL INFORMATION AND BIOMETRIC DATA BE 
PROTECTED UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL PRIVACY 
STATUTE THAT USES THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT 
AND THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT AS 
MODEL LAWS? 
 
By Donald L. Buresh1 
 
The issue addressed in this paper was that only a minority of 
states have passed privacy and biometric privacy rights laws. The 
collection, storage, use, and dissemination of personal information and 
biometric data is becoming paramount due to the public’s ever-
increasing desire for security. The purpose of this study was to 
understand and evaluate the privacy and property issues that states 
confront that are inherent within the use and results of employing 
personal information and biometric data to enhance corporate security 
in their efforts to protect individual privacy. This research addressed 
the following questions: (1) What are the biometric privacy issues that 
states face regarding individual and corporate needs for security and 
privacy?; (2) Why do the several states continue to be vulnerable to 
litigation regarding biometric privacy issues?; (3) How does the State 
of Illinois address biometric privacy issues in its statutory effort to 
protect individuals against organizations that employ biometric 
cybersecurity procedures?; and (4) How does the Illinois Biometric 
Information Privacy Act benefit the federal government and other 
states in their efforts to create and pass biometric privacy laws that 
      
1 Donald L. Buresh earned his Ph.D. in the management of engineering and 
technology from Northcentral University. His dissertation assessed customer 
satisfaction for both agile-driven and plan-driven software development 
projects. Dr. Buresh also earned a J.D. from The John Marshall Law School 
located in Chicago, Illinois, focusing on cyber law and intellectual property. 
He also earned an LL.M in intellectual property from the University of 
Illinois Chicago Law School (formerly, The John Marshall Law School). Dr. 
Buresh received an M.P.S. in cybersecurity policy and an M.S. in 
cybersecurity concentrating in cyber intelligence, both from Utica College. 
He has an M.B.A. from the University of Massachusetts Lowell, focusing on 
operations management, an M.A. in economics from Boston College, and a 
B.S. from the University of Illinois Chicago, majoring in mathematics and 
philosophy. Dr. Buresh is a member of Delta Mu Delta, Sigma Iota Epsilon, 
Epsilon Pi Tau, Phi Delta Phi, Phi Alpha Delta, and Phi Theta Kappa. He has 
over 25 years of paid professional experience in Information Technology and 
has taught economics, project management, and negotiation at several 
universities. Dr. Buresh is an avid Chicago White Sox fan and keeps active 
by fencing épée at a local fencing club. 
 





protect the privacy rights of their citizens? Four key findings are 
discussed in this study. The major finding was that neither the 
California Consumer Privacy Act as amended, the California Privacy 
Right Act nor Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act overlap to 
form a far-reaching privacy law because the subject matters of both 
laws are different. The recommendations argue that the United States 
needs an all-inclusive privacy law that encompasses both personal 
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The privacy rights regarding the collection, use, storage, and 
dissemination of individual biometric data are in flux. Illinois, Texas, 
and Washington have passed biometric privacy laws within the last 20 
years. Two states that are evaluating biometric privacy bills before their 
respective legislatures are Maryland and New York. The issue is that 
only a tiny minority of states recognize biometric privacy rights. The 
collection, storage, use, and dissemination of biometric data is 
becoming paramount due to the public’s ever-increasing desire for 
security. How both federal and state governments respond to this 
craving for security concerning individual biometric data is an open 
question. Thus, this section aims to introduce privacy law in general, 
biometric privacy law, and what biometric information is and what it 
is not. 
The purpose of this essay is to understand and evaluate the 
privacy and property issues that States confront that are inherent within 
the use and results of using biometrics to enhance corporate security in 
their efforts to protect individual privacy. This paper examines the 
Supreme Court cases that deal with an individual’s right to privacy as 
well as several cases involving Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy 
Act (BIPA). It also discusses the recent American approaches to 
privacy and compares these approaches to how privacy is addressed in 
the European Union. The three states that have passed biometric 
security legislation into law are Illinois, Texas, and Washington. The 
Maryland and New York legislatures are debating similar bills. In 
conjunction with a brief description of the Texas and Washington 
biometric laws, the study examines Illinois’ BIPA because it is a 
comprehensive biometric law that could become a model for federal 
legislation and a future standard to be used by the other states. Finally, 
because individuals have a vested interest in protecting their biometric 
data from misuse, the public could benefit from this analysis by 
understanding what they can expect from their state and the federal 
government to collect, store, use, and disseminate biometric data. 
This essay’s questions are: (1) What are the biometric privacy 
issues that States face regarding individual and corporate needs for 
security and privacy?; (2) Why do several States continue to be 
vulnerable to litigation regarding biometric privacy issues?; (3) How 
does the State of Illinois address biometric privacy issues in its 
statutory effort to protect the individuals against organizations that 
employ biometric cybersecurity procedures?; and (4) How does the 
State of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act benefit the federal 
government and other states in their efforts to create and pass biometric 
privacy laws that protect the privacy rights of their citizens? 





I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. A Brief History of Privacy Law 
In the United States, privacy law began with the publication of 
the 1890 Harvard Law Review article by Warren and Brandeis, where 
the authors declared that privacy as a liberty right is “the right to be left 
alone.”2 Warren and Brandeis asserted that the purpose of their article 
was to “consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can 
properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it 
does, what the nature and extent of such protection is.”3 Warren and 
Brandeis suggested that the law of nuisance and defamation were 
inadequate protections because these laws did not “protect the privacy 
of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the 
photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for 
recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.”4 Essentially, Warren and 
Brandeis argued that there was no law to prevent the publication of 
information regarding individuals.5 The Boston Brahmins, the elite of 
Boston high society in the 1890s, desired their data to remain private 
and out of the public domain.6 The authors proposed that there should 
be laws to prevent the publication of information individuals deem to 
be confidential.7 
In the first 50 years of the 20th Century, the law in the United 
States did not recognize the right to privacy. In Olmstead, the Supreme 
Court held that “obtaining of the evidence and its use at the trial did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.”8 According to the Fourth Amendment, 
an individual is protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.9 
The Fourth Amendment states that a search or seizure is reasonable 
only when a warrant is issued by a neutral magistrate, where probable 
cause exists, and where the warrant is “supported by [o]ath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized”.10 In this case, the Court concluded 
      
2 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARVARD 
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
3 Id. at 197. 
4 Id. at 206. 
5 See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 438 (1928).  
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
10 Id. 




that wiretapping a private telephone conversation without a warrant did 
not violate Olmstead’s Fourth Amendment rights.11 
The Supreme Court first expressly recognized the right to 
privacy in Griswold.12 Here, three individuals were arrested and fined 
for providing contraceptive advice: the executive director of the 
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, a physician, and a Yale 
University professor.13 In 1965, Connecticut law prohibited any 
method of preventing conception.14 The issue was whether a married 
couple possessed a right to privacy when given contraceptive advice.15 
The Court held that the Connecticut law was unconstitutional and that 
married couples enjoyed a right to privacy when being given 
contraceptive advice.16 
 In Katz, the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead by 
extending an individual’s Fourth Amendment protection to all areas or 
places where that person demonstrates a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.17 In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan created the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test for determining when a 
government activity is a search.18 Justice Harlan formulated a two-
pronged test for determining whether the privacy interest is present.19 
First, an individual must exhibit an actual or subjective expectation of 
privacy.20 Second, the expectation of privacy must be an expectation 
that society recognizes or is prepared to acknowledge as reasonable.21 
After Griswold and Katz, the Court seemed to reverse itself 
when it opined that the use and installation of a pen register, which is 
an electronic machine that records the numbers that are dialed from a 
telephone, by law enforcement is not a violation of an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.22 A 
pen register is an archaic and pre-Internet device that only recorded 
telephone numbers.23 
      
11 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438. 
12 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). 
13 Id. at 480.  
14 Id. 
15 See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. 
16 Id. 
17 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
18 See Katz 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (2018). 





In Kyllo, the Court opined that using a forward-looking infrared 
(FLIR) device, which is also known as a thermal imaging device, to 
monitor the amount of infrared radiation that emanates from an 
individual’s home, was a search that required a warrant based on 
probable cause.24 A FLIR is a thermographic camera, typically 
employed on military and civilian aircraft, that senses infrared 
radiation.25 Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion, contended that the 
device’s employment violated Kyllo’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.26 A decade later, Justice Scalia concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment bars law enforcement from putting a global positioning 
system on a vehicle to keep track of its location without a warrant.27 
In Riley, the Supreme Court stated that the search and seizure 
of a cell phone’s digital contents when a person is being arrested are 
unconstitutional.28 In the Court’s opinion, a cell phone’s digital 
contents are not a threat to officer safety.29 In this case, the issue was 
that significant problems exist when searching the contents of a cell 
phone.30 The Court concluded that searching the contents of a person’s 
cell phone is equivalent to law enforcement searching through the 
private papers located in an individual’s house.31 
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority 
opinion.32 Here, the Court refused to give law enforcement access to 
cell phone metadata without a warrant.33 The reasons dealt with the 
breadth, depth, and comprehensive nature of the metadata collection 
process.34 In other words, a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding the collection, use, and dissemination of cell phone 
metadata.35  
However, Carpenter’s four separate minority opinions are 
particularly relevant regarding collecting, storing, using, and 
disseminating biometric information about human beings’ innate 
      
24 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-41 (2001). 
25  Anatholy Medvev, What is a “Forward Looking Infrared Imaging 
System?”, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, (n.d.), 
https://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,,-203857,00.html. 
26 Kyllo, 533 U.S. 31, 33-35. 
27 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
28 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
29 Id. at 387. 
30 Id. at 378.  
31 Id. at 396-397. 
32 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
33 Id. at 2223. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 2219. 




characteristics.36 The views of Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas 
can be encapsulated into a simple phrase – no property rights, no 
privacy.37 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion is of particular interest when 
discussing whether biometric information should be protected.38 
According to Justice Gorsuch, cell phone providers are bailees who 
hold cell phone metadata to benefit the metadata or cell phone owners, 
also known as bailors.39 A bailor is a person, natural or corporate, who 
temporarily relinquishes possession of a good or other property under 
a bailment agreement without surrendering ownership or property 
rights.40 The bailor entrusts possession of a good or property to another 
person known as the bailee.41 An example of a bailor/bailee 
relationship occurs when an individual takes their watch to a jeweler to 
be repaired. In this instance, the bailor is the watch owner who is taking 
the watch to a jeweler to be repaired. The bailee is the jeweler whom 
the bailor hires to repair the watch. The bailment is the agreement or 
contract between the bailor and the bailee whereby the bailor entrusts 
the bailee with the watch to be repaired.42 
B. Definition of Biometric Information and Biometric 
Identifiers 
The link between cell phone metadata and biometric data is that 
biometric information can be considered metadata about an individual. 
This is significant because, according to Pomerantz, the common-sense 
definition of metadata is that it is data about data.43 This definition is 
unsatisfactory because it is vague.44 However, Pomerantz pointed out 
that the definition can be salvaged if data are thought of as a 
“potentially informative object about another potentially informative 
object”.45 In other words, metadata is a statement about a potentially 
informative object.46 The conclusion is that human beings can be 
      
36 Id. at 2223-61 (Kennedy, CJ, Alito & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 2268-69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
39 Id.; see generally Donald L. Buresh, The Meaning of Justice Gorsuch’s 
Dissent in Carpenter v. United States, 43 AMER. J. OF TRIAL ADV. 55 (2019), 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/amjtrad43&d
iv=7&id=&page=. 
40 Bailor, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969). 
41 Bailee, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969). 
42 Regular deposit, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969). 
 
43 JEFFREY C. POMERANTZ, METADATA 19 (2015). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 26. 
46 Id. 





modeled as potentially informative objects, where biometric 
information are implied statements about a person. 
In consonance with these ideas, Illinois’ Biometric Information 
Privacy Act defined biometric information to be “any information, 
regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on 
an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.”47 
Biometric information does not include information derived from items 
or procedures excluded under the definition of biometric identifiers.48 
Youmarin and Adler defined biometric information as the “decrease in 
uncertainty about a person’s identity due to a set of biometric features 
measurements.”49  
Biometric features or identifiers are distinctive and measurable 
characteristics used to label and describe individuals.50 Biometric 
identifiers are typically categorized as physiological versus behavioral 
characteristics.51 Physiological characteristics are related to the shape 
of the body.52 For example, fingerprints, palm veins, face geometry, 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), palm prints, hand scans, iris 
recognition, retina, and odor or scent are all physiological 
characteristics.53 Behavioral factors are associated with behavior 
patterns, including typing rhythm, gait, keystroke, signature, 
behavioral profiling, and voice.54  
 It is also essential to understand what is not biometric 
information. The Biometric Information Privacy Act states that 
“writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human biological 
samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic 
data, tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height, 
      
47 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/10 (2008), 
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57. 
48 Id. 
49 Richard Youmarin, & Andy Adler, Measuring Information Content in 
Biometric Features, In NIKOLAOS V. BOULGOURIS, KONSTANTINOS N. 
PLATANIOTIS, & EVANGELIA MICHELI-TZANAKOU (EDS.). BIOMETRICS: 
THEORY, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 579, 579-580 (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2010).  
50 Abdulaziz Alzubaidi & Jugal Kalita,, Authentication of Smartphone Users 
Using Behavioral Biometrics, 18 IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & 
TUTORIALS, 1998, 2001 (2016). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Natalie Prescott, The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What U.S. Companies 
Need To Know in 2020, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2020), available at 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/anatomy-biometric-laws-what-us-
companies-need-to-know-2020. 
54 Alzubaidi & Kalita, supra note 49, at 2001. 




weight, hair color, or eye color are not biometric information.”55 
Biometric information also does not include “donated organs, tissues, 
or parts … or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or potential 
recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or stored by 
a federally designated organ procurement agency.”56 The term 
biometric identifiers does not cover regulated biological materials 
(specifically, in Illinois, the Genetic Information Privacy Act of 2020), 
information captured from a patient in a health care setting, or 
information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, 
payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act.57 Finally, biometric identifiers do not involve 
“an X-ray, roentgen process, computed tomography, M.R.I., P.E.T. 
scan, mammography, or other image or film of the human anatomy 
used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or other medical 
condition or to further validate scientific testing or screening.”58 
C. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The reasonable expectation of privacy test may be inapplicable 
when analyzing the implications of collecting, using, storing, and 
disseminating biometric information because it may be readily 
discernable by third parties. When information is released voluntarily 
by an individual to a third party, that individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.59 Conversely, it can be inferred that when 
information is revealed involuntarily, a person may have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.60 Even so, the scope of this study is limited to 
when biometric information is voluntarily divulged. This study also 
discusses the legal consequences to third parties that involuntarily 
collect, use, store, and disseminate biometric data about individuals, as 
set forth in more detail below. 
D. Biometric Information and Property Rights 
Property rights give individuals privacy rights regarding their 
biometric information. In Carpenter, Justices Alito, Kennedy, and 
Thomas proclaimed in their minority opinions that property rights 
bestow an individual’s privacy rights.61 Justice Gorsuch also 
      




59 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012). 
60 See Id. 
61 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223-61 (2018) (Kennedy, CJ, 
Alito & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 





acknowledged that privacy rights are intimately related to property 
rights when he stated that cell phone providers are bailees when 
entrusted with the metadata generated by a cell phone by cell phone 
owners or bailors.62 In his seminal work on privacy, Lessig argued that 
property is privacy.63 Humbach effectively argued that property rights 
had protected privacy in privately-owned spaces that store personal 
information such as papers and digital equipment for hundreds of 
years.64 Kerrane observed that when an individual possesses a 
legitimate property interest in a location or an item, third parties that 
gain unauthorized access to that property violate an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.65 
Because places and objects are external to a human being and 
thus not necessarily “private,” the question is whether individuals 
possess property rights to their biometric information. According to the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act, “[n]o private entity in possession 
of a biometric identifier or biometric information may sell, lease, trade, 
or otherwise profit from a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier 
or biometric information.”66 This statement sounds all too familiar to 
the right of publicity which protects a person’s intangible proprietary 
interest in the commercial value in their identity.67 The right to privacy 
to information regarding one’s person was clarified by Prosser when 
he organized the right to privacy doctrine into the following four 
distinct torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon another’s seclusion, (2) 
public disclosure of private facts, (3) false light invasion of privacy, 
and (4) appropriation of another’s name or likeness.68 
From the four torts listed above, the public disclosure of private 
facts is the most relevant to disclosing biometric information. Although 
most state laws specify that the right of publicity protects a person’s 
      
62 Id. at 2268-69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
63 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69  SOC’Y. RSCH. 247 
(2002), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971547?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
64 John A. Humbach, Privacy and the Right of Free Expression, 11 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 16, 17 (2012), 
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/863/. 
65 Kaitlyn A. Kerrane, Keeping up with Officer Jones: A Comprehensive Look 
at the Fourth Amendment and GPS Surveillance. 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 
1709 (2011), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss4/8.  
66 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(c) (2008), 
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57. 
67 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 445 (1979).  
68 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960),  
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3478805?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab690af40da42
182b188450a5d603a842&seq=1. 




identity when such information is used for commercial purposes, 
private individuals, not just celebrities, can also sue for instances of 
public disclosure of private facts.69 In other words, the unauthorized 
use of biometric information about a person, much like the 
infringement of a person’s right of publicity, is an encroachment on an 
individual’s property rights.70 The implication is that individuals 
possess property rights to their biometric information, and those rights 
are deserving of legal protection. One function of a sovereign state 
should be to protect individual property rights.71  
E. The Importance of Biometric Privacy 
At both the federal and state levels, private organizations and 
governments readily acquire vast amounts of data on individuals as 
they go about their daily business.72 Almost everything people use 
these days demands that they log into their email address, Facebook 
profile, and even cell phones.73 These software applications collect and 
store metadata regarding what websites are visited, how long one is on 
a website, what a person buys on a website, etc.74 These organizations, 
such as Facebook and Google, make money by collecting personal 
information and then selling it to third parties.75 What is immediately 
apparent from the picture just painted is that privacy is on the decline. 
F. Reasons for Why Biometric Privacy Is Important 
According to Reetz and his colleagues, the technologies 
associated with social media, electronic communication, mobile 
devices, intelligent home assistants, biometric authentication, 
autonomous vehicles, digital health monitors, and the emerging 
dominance of artificial intelligence are some of the forces transforming 
      
69 JONATHAN S. JENNINGS, & J. MICHAEL MONAHAN, TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION: CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE LAW 5-13 (2014). 
70 Id. at 174-175. 
71 ROGER PILON, Property Rights and the Constitution, in CATO INSTITUTE, 
CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 173-91 (8th ed. 2017), 
https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-
makers-8th-edition-2017/property-rights-constitution. 
72 Michael Monajemi, Privacy Regulation in the Age of Biometrics that Deal 
with a New World Order of Information, 25 UNIV. OF MIAMI INT’L. & COMP. 










human activities, both in the public and private arenas.76 Central to 
understanding privacy in general, and biometric privacy in particular, 
is the question of how much people value their privacy and what evils 
should privacy and biometric privacy attempt to deter.77 The public’s 
comfort level regarding collecting personal information depends on the 
type of data being collected and how such data is used by organizations 
collecting, storing, using, and disseminating that data.78 
On its face, the future of privacy is uncertain. According to 
Kleven, privacy cases’ critical procedural issue is “minimum virtual 
contacts” to establish personal jurisdiction.79 According to the Legal 
Information Institute, minimum contacts for a non-resident defendant 
with a forum state (i.e., the state where a plaintiff brings a suit) are the 
connections that a defendant has with the forum state.80  The 
maintenance of a lawsuit without minimum contacts in the state offends 
the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” and, in turn, 
violates the Due Process Clause.81 Kleven proposed that minimum 
virtual contacts are similar to, if not the same as, the traditional 
minimum contacts legal principle.82 
Hu observed that governments’ evolution into cyber-
surveillance states is occurring because governments are employing 
technologies that combine biometric and biographic data to target 
digital data associated with suspicious individuals.83 Hu opined that the 
progression to becoming a cyber-surveillance state is making it 
increasingly difficult to identify and challenge an individual’s 
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constitutional right to a reasonable expectation of privacy.84 Jones 
observed that biometric identification systems had transformed 
government, military, and private-industry identification and 
verification procedures.85 
G. Examples of Why Biometric Privacy Is Important 
But there is more. According to Metzger, businesses 
increasingly require their employees to permit biometric data collection 
technologies to clock their hours, probably to verify or increase 
productivity.86 The issue is that with this embracing of biometric 
technology comes privacy and security concerns.87 For example, the 
front office of a Major League Baseball (MLB) team is charged with 
creating a solid team, which usually results in winning more games, 
attracting more fans, and increasing profits.88 In many cases, players 
need coaching to hone their baseball skills, and clubs need to separate 
major league-caliber players from the plethora of minor league players 
whose abilities do not meet MLB performance standards.89 Zych aptly 
observed that the question of property rights to biometric data is 
temporarily set aside in favor of exploiting the data to win baseball 
games.90 Justice Gorsuch precisely attempted to resolve this issue in his 
dissent in Carpenter when he opined that cell phone providers are 
bailees entrusted with cell phone metadata by bailors or cell phone 
owners.91 Furthermore, Garlewicz described how soccer teams are 
collecting biometric data about their players to determine which 
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players will be successful in the major leagues.92 Gale analyzed the 
legal implications in collecting athlete biometric data (ABD), pointing 
out that a precise ABD definition is difficult to achieve due to the 
myriad of ways ABD interacts with the sports industry.93 
Logan stated that eye-tracking technology has existed since the 
1950s.94 As eye-tracking hardware and software have become 
ubiquitous,95 Logan argued that if privacy rights are established for 
biometric identifiers, there will be less friction in creating new 
technologies.96 According to Logan, this situation will permit rapid 
growth for eager and informed consumers.97 In particular, Norris 
pointed out that casinos have been tracking people’s activities inside 
their establishments for years.98 Casinos possess an abundance of 
private data that demonstrates how people behave when they are under 
surveillance.99  
Still another example is that immigration officials and other 
bureaucrats collect biometric data to ensure that immigrants’ identities 
can be unambiguously determined.100 Classification systems were 
generated to ensure that a person’s identity was unambiguously 
verified by employing official documents over time and across 
countries.101 According to Kim, the use of biometric data in the 
immigration process is beneficial not only to the government but also 
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to the individual because it can speed up an inherently tedious 
process.102 
There are definite and well-defined benefits of collecting, 
storing, using, and disseminating biometric information by 
organizations.103 However, in all fairness, the harms should also be 
discussed. Reetz and his colleagues observed that significant risks and 
exposures have evolved from concerns regarding personal privacy and 
the confidentiality of corporate assets to threats of organizational 
interference and operational disruptions, such as cybersecurity 
attacks.104 They also observed that with the emergence of biometric 
data collection, storage, use, and dissemination, there are direct threats 
of illegal transfers of funds and actual physical harm, injury, and 
loss.105 The question that Reetz and his colleagues asked was whether 
the privacy “landscape [has] changed so profoundly that entirely new 
approaches are required.”106 
H. Harms Due to Violations of Biometric Privacy 
According to Wright, there are broad implications of biometric 
privacy harms that justify far-reaching privacy regulations rather than 
a narrow concentration on data security and self-regulation.107 Wright 
argued that in regulating the collection, storage, use, and dissemination 
of biometric data, a collaborative approach with private organizations 
might significantly benefit society because of the lack of technical 
expertise among legislators.108 An example of harm is privacy leakage, 
where privacy leakage is the amount of information that a public 
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message contains about biometric enrollments.109 According to 
Gomez-Barrero and his colleagues, when morphed biometric samples 
or templates are introduced into a biometric recognition system, the 
subjects that contribute to the morphed sample can be successfully 
verified against an enrolled template.110 This unique link precipitates 
serious security gaps when verifying electronic travel documents.111 
Gomez-Barrero and his colleagues observed that a systematic approach 
to predicting biometric vulnerabilities has not yet been established.112 
They then proposed a framework for evaluating the exposure to 
security gaps of biometric systems.113 
Thus, it is evident that biometric privacy is of paramount 
importance. However, to appreciate the importance of biometric 
privacy, a melodic interlude into the realm of privacy law, in general, 
is needed. The succeeding subsections of this literature will discuss the 
European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
followed by a brief discussion of the privacy laws of the several states, 
including the California Consumer Privacy Act and its amendment, the 
California Privacy Rights Act, the Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 
603A, the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, along with a 
discussion of the status of various privacy bills in the several states. 
Next, the essay will talk about the biometric privacy laws in Illinois, 
Texas, and Washington, where the emphasis is given to the Illinois 
Biometric Privacy Act (BIPA) because it is the most detailed of the 
various biometric privacy laws currently in force. Finally, the study 
will summarize the literature review contained herein. 
II. GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a set of 
legal guidelines that deal with collecting and processing personal 
information about people who live and reside in the European Union.114 
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The GDPR applies independently from where a website is based.115 
Any site accessed by a European visitor, regardless of whether an 
organization markets goods or services to EU residents, must comply 
with the regulation.116  
A. A Brief History of the General Data Protection 
Regulation 
On September 23, 1980, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), a European international 
organization, approved the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data.117 Although the OECD guidelines 
were not obligatory, the document specified a framework for future 
privacy legislation and court opinions.118 The principles listed in the 
guidelines (1) ensured that the collection of personal information was 
lawful, (2) specified that the use of personal information should be 
accurate, complete, and current, (3) stated that the purpose of collecting 
information should be explicit before any data is collected, (4) required 
that personal information should be reasonably protected against the 
risks of destruction, disclosure, loss, modification, unauthorized 
access, and use, (5) demanded that practices and procedures be readily 
available, (6) acknowledged that individuals have the right to acquire 
their personal information that was collected or verify that the data 
exists, and (7) warranted that data control organizations were 
accountable for complying with these principles.119 
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In 1990, the European Commission (EC) published a Data 
Protection Directive (DPD) proposal.120 In 1995, after five years of 
negotiations, the final DPD, also known as Directive 95/46/EC, was 
adopted by the EU.121 There were immediate problems with the 
directive because it did not harmonize with the privacy laws of EU 
member nations, and thus, the enforcement of the directive was 
haphazard.122 In 2009, the EC began consulting with the EU member 
nations, and in 2012, the EC published the first proposed text of the 
GDPR.123 In 2015, and after nearly 4,000 amendments, the Council of 
the European Union (CEU) published its proposal for the GDPR and 
started its negotiations with the European Parliament (EP).124 In 
December 2015, the EP and the CEU agreed on the final text of the 
GDPR, which was adopted in May 2016, and went in force on May 25, 
2018, replacing the DPD.125  
B. Content of the General Data Protection Regulation 
The GDPR consists of 11 chapters, 99 articles, and 173 
recitals.126 The general obligations that an organization must follow are 
contained in Article 24, whereas Article 28 categorizes the technical 
and organizational measures for data processors.127 According to 
Article 6, the processing of personal information should be predicated 
on at least one lawful basis, such as “consent, compliance with a legal 
duty, contract, performance, protection of the vital interests of the data 
subject, and the legitimate interest of the data controller.”128 Article 
9(1) prevents entities from the processing of personal information that 
reveals “racial or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, political sentiments, 
religious beliefs, union membership, or genetic or biometric data that 
can be employed in identifying an individual.”129 Article 9(2) lists the 
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exclusions to Article 9(1), including when a data subject agrees to 
publicize personal information.130  
Article 30 requires that personal information controllers and 
processors maintain a record of their processing activities.131 Article 
4(11) posits that consent must be explicit, while opt-out consent is 
forbidden.132 A data subject can withdraw consent at any time.133 Under 
Article 33, data protection authorities must be informed within 72 
hours after a breach becomes known.134 Article 34 demands that if there 
is a high risk that individual rights and freedoms will be violated due 
to a breach, data subjects must be informed, subject to the exceptions 
in Article 34(3).135 Article 37 specifies that organizations have a data 
protection officer charged with protecting the personal information of 
data subjects and is responsible for informing data controllers, 
processors, and employees that they are accountable under the 
GDPR.136  
According to Article 3(2), the GDPR applies to any company 
that falls within its territorial and material scope, including firms 
located in the United States.137 First, Article 3(2) applies to the 
processing of personal information of an establishment or 
organization.138 Second, the GDPR pertains to the processing of 
personal information of data subjects regarding the offering of goods 
or services to EU data subjects.139 Finally, the GDPR concerns the data 
processing activities that deal with monitoring the activities of EU data 
subjects.140 What Article 3(2) means is that if an American firm does 
business with individuals or organizations in the EU, it must comply 
with the GDPR. Regarding biometric privacy, Article 14(4) is 
particularly relevant because when a data controller intends to process 
data for which the relevant consents are not obtained, the GDPR 
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requires that the data controller provide the data subject with the new 
reason for collecting the data.141 When considering Articles 9(1) and 
14(4) together, they explicitly address how biometric information 
should be handled by organizations that do business with EU data 
subjects or EU establishments. 
C. Google v. Costeja González and The Right to Be 
Forgotten 
The case Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González is particularly 
significant when discussing privacy and biometric privacy within the 
European Union.142 Costeja González is significant because it 
demonstrates the European belief that the right to privacy, and 
biometric privacy, can be construed to be the right to be forgotten.143 
The case balances an individual’s right to privacy and the EU’s data 
protection regulations versus an organization’s and the public’s right to 
know.144 
In the case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
held that Google Spain SL and Google, Inc. must eradicate links to web 
pages that are freely accessible worldwide when individuals whose 
personal information is contained therein demand that the links be 
removed.145 The result of the CJEU ruling was that an internet search 
engine must address the requests of individuals who ask that links be 
eliminated to freely accessible web pages when a third party conducts 
a search based on the individual’s name.146 The eradication reasons 
include situations where the search results are facially inadequate, no 
longer relevant, or an excessive amount of time has elapsed.147 If the 
search engine refuses to honor the plea, an individual can petition the 
EU courts to redress grievances.148 The European courts reserve the 
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right to overrule the search engine’s decision and order the controller 
to take specific measures accordingly.149 
In 1998, La Vanguardia, a Spanish newspaper, published two 
announcements regarding a forced sale of properties from social 
security debts.150 The statements were published by the Spanish 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to entice people to bid on an 
auction’s properties.151 The announcements were also published on the 
newspaper’s website.152 One of the properties belonged to Mario 
Costeja González, and he was specifically named in one of the 
announcements.153 In 2010, Costeja González requested that his name 
no longer be part of the Google database.154 Costeja González wanted 
his name removed because the forced sale occurred nearly ten years 
earlier and was no longer relevant.155 La Vanguardia denied the request 
under the belief that erasing Costeja González’s data was improper 
because the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs had ordered 
that his name be published.156  
In his complaint, Costeja González asked Google Spain SL to 
remove the links.157 Google Spain SL alerted Google, Inc., regarding 
the suit.158 Costeja González then filed a complaint with the Spanish 
Data Protection Agency, or the Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), requesting that La Vanguardia, and Google Spain SL 
or Google, Inc. delete the links.159 On July 30, 2010, the AEPD rejected 
the complaint against La Vanguardia but endorsed the complaint 
against Google Spain SL and Google, Inc.160 Google Spain SL and 
Google, Inc. appealed Spain’s National High Court decision, or the 
Audiencia Nacional (AN).161 Google Spain SL and Google, Inc. argued 
that (1) EU Directive 95/46/EC did not have jurisdiction over Google, 
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Inc., (2) no data processing occurred, (3) if data processing did occur, 
neither Google, Inc. nor Google Spain SL were data controllers, and 
Costeja González had no right to ask the search engine to remove the 
offending links.162 The AN issued a stay pending a preliminary decision 
from the CJEU based on EU Directive 95/46/EC.163 The case was heard 
by the CJEU, and on May 13, 2014, the CJEU published its 
judgment.164  
The CJEU concluded that Google Spain SL’s and Google, 
Inc.’s reasons were not compelling.165 The court opined that Google, 
Inc. was responsible for removing Costeja González’s data.166 The 
forced sale of Costeja González’s property should be electronically 
forgotten because the information was no longer relevant.167 The CJEU 
also held that Article 14(a) of EU Directive 95/46/EC as related to 
Articles 7(e) and 7(f) permitted Costeja González to object to the 
search engine keeping his data online.168 Finally, Article 12(b)  allowed 
Costeja González to ask the search engine to remove his data.169 In 
terms of biometric information, Costeja González implies that EU data 
subjects have the right to request that organizations subject to the 
GDPR remove their data without limitation, subject to the exceptions 
contained in the regulation.170 
III. PRIVACY LAWS IN THE SEVERAL STATES 
In this section of this essay, the California Consumer Privacy 
Act and its amendment, the California Privacy Rights Act, the Nevada 
privacy law, the Maine privacy law, the Virginia Consumer Data 
Protection Act, and the Colorado Privacy Act will be discussed in turn. 
The states where privacy bills are under legislative review will also be 
examined because it is crucial to understand where privacy law is 
headed. 
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A. California Consumer Privacy Act 
On June 28, 2018, then California Governor Jerry Brown 
signed SB-375, also known as the California Consumer Privacy Act 
(CCPA).171 The California legislature passed the first amendments to 
the CCPA on August 31, 2018, and the CCPA became effective on 
January 1, 2020.172 The purpose of the law was to protect the personal 
information of California consumers regardless of what sector of the 
economy the data originated.173 In the United States, there is no 
comprehensive privacy law that defends consumers from the 
collection, storage, use, and dissemination of personal information by 
private entities such as the GDPR.174 Congress has passed privacy laws 
on a topic-by-topic basis predicated on practical political needs, such 
as adopting the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act.175 
The CCPA considers a California resident domiciled to be a 
California consumer under the CCPA.176 The statute does not protect 
the personal information of individuals temporarily located within 
California.177 The CCPA applies to for-profit businesses and 
partnerships that collect and process personal information of California 
consumers, where (1) the annual revenue of the company is greater than 
$25 million, (2) the firm receives or discloses the personal information 
of at least 50,000 California residents, and (3) fifty percent or more of 
an entity’s annual revenue is derived from selling personal 
information.178 
According to the CCPA, a California resident possesses the 
right to know the classes of personal information collected, the source 
of the personal information, and what entities are purchasing that 
information.179 California residents also have the right to review the 
personal information being amassed to ensure that only correct 
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information is being marshaled.180 Finally, California residents enjoy 
the right to request that their personal information be deleted, or in 
other words, California residents possess the right to be forgotten.181 
There are seven critical provisions in the CCPA. First, 
California consumers have the right to opt out of the sale of their 
personal information.182 Second, businesses that the CCPA cover 
cannot charge California residents a higher price when they exercise 
their rights under the Act.183 Third, a data collection firm is required to 
give California consumers a copy of their data in an electronic format 
that is easily transferable.184 Fourth, for individuals that are under 16 
years of age, a data collection company must be given permission by 
the parents or guardians of that individual before the entity can sell the 
person’s personal information.185 Fifth, any company doing business in 
California must disclose to the public on an annual basis the categories, 
recipients, and sources of all of the data that the firm collects, stores, 
discloses, or sells.186 Sixth, a link must exist on a corporation’s website 
entitled “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” that allows California 
residents to exercise their right not to sell their personal information.187 
Finally, an organization doing business in California is required to 
stipulate two methods where a consumer can request their personal 
information from a company.188 
The CCPA specifies two types of non-compliance penalties. 
First, there are penalties due to security breaches. According to the 
CCPA, the damages are at most $750 per violation or the actual 
damages, whatever is the greater amount.189 The Attorney General of 
California may enforce the privacy provision of the CCPA via civil 
penalties with a maximum of $7,500 per violation.190 For example, it is 
not uncommon for a data breach to involve one million individuals. At 
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$750 per violation, the maximum penalty would be $750 million, 
whereas if the Attorney General of California decides to sue the entity, 
the maximum penalty would be $7.5 billion.191 Thus, it is readily 
apparent that the maximum penalties under the CCPA could be beyond 
the financial reach of many organizations.192 
Palmieri employed a three-prong analysis framework when 
analyzing the effectiveness of the CCPA.193  First, the data stewardship 
prong examines a company’s personal information collection 
process.194 In this first element, Palmieri opined that although an 
individual is at the center of the decision-making process regarding 
collecting, storing, using, and disseminating their personal information, 
consumers are rarely aware of the nature of the data being collected or 
how that data will be used.195 Another issue with this first prong is that 
many websites use a take-it-or-leave-it approach when an individual is 
given a choice whether to accept or reject a firm’s collection of their 
personal information.196 In the initial version of the CCPA, the consent 
mechanism was not nuanced, reflecting the consent process’ myriad 
variations.197 
The second prong of Palmieri’s analysis dealt with a 
government’s balancing of the harms between alienating an individual 
versus a business when an entity collects personal information on the 
person.198 The issue is what weight the State of California should be 
given to each possible harm.199 One factor to consider is the industry 
being examined when safeguards are present to prevent or regulate 
cross-industry sharing of data.200 According to Palmieri, the CCPA 
volunteers no guidance to entities contemplating whether a specific 
processing activity is worth the risk.201 The third and final prong of 
Palmieri’s analysis is the element of redressability, meaning that there 
are sufficient procedures and precautions to ensure that California 
consumers have access to their personal information and can respond 
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to improper uses of that data.202 According to Palmieri, the CCPA 
excels at providing transparency to consumers.203 Palmieri aptly 
pointed out that the deletion of personal information is not the only 
mechanism available.204 Still, the opt-out choice also ensures that an 
individual’s personal information is not collected.205 In other words, 
data that are never collected in the first place can never be wrong. 
For these and other limitations of the CCPA, in the November 
2020 election, California residents amended the California Consumer 
Privacy Act in passing the California Privacy Rights Act. 
B. California Privacy Rights Act 
In the November 2020 election, the citizens of California 
passed Proposition 24, also known as the California Privacy Rights Act 
(CPRA), by 56 percent.206 With the passage of the CPRA, California 
citizens now have the right to correct inaccurate information, the right 
to have their personal information that is collected be subordinate to 
data minimization and purpose limitations, and the right to receive a 
notice from businesses planning on employing sensitive personal 
information, along with the right to request that such an organization 
stop using that information.207 The CPRA expanded the right to access 
information regardless of when it was collected unless it is impossible 
or impracticable, the right to opt-out of sharing information with third 
parties regardless of whether an individual is a buyer or a seller, and 
the right to sue a business when the entity exposes user names and 
passwords.208 The CPRA is scheduled to take effect on January 1, 
2023.209 
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The CPRA consists of a fair number of enhancements to the 
CCPA.210 The CPRA changed the threshold for the number of 
consumers or households to 100,000 and now applies to businesses that 
receive 50 percent or more of their annual revenue from selling or 
sharing consumer personal information.211 The CPRA gives California 
consumers the right to opt-out of automated decision-making 
technology associated with a consumer’s economic situation, health 
and personal preferences, location or movements, and work 
performance while strengthening the opt-out rights for minors.212 The 
CPRA introduced the notion of sensitive personal information, such as 
biometric or health information, the content of non-public information 
(i.e., email and text messages), ethnicity, genetic data, race, religious 
or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual orientation information, and 
union membership, where sensitive personal information now 
possesses stringent consent, disclosure, opt-out requirements, and 
purpose limitation requirements.213 
Under the CPRA, consumers have the right, subject to some 
exceptions, to demand the deletion of any consumer personal 
information purchase or sold.214 Suppose consumer personal 
information is inaccurate. With the passage of the CPRA, California 
consumers now have the right to correct erroneous information along 
with the right to restrict the use and disclosure of sensitive personal 
information.215 The CPRA distinguishes between requests for specific 
information from requests for general personal information. Under the 
CPRA, consumers have the right to access meaningful information 
regarding the decision-making logic used in collecting, using, storing, 
disseminating information, and describing the likely outcomes of the 
process.216 Under the CPRA, consumers may request the business 
transmit specific personal information, when technically feasible, to 
third parties.217 The CPRA requires a company to perform an annual 
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cybersecurity audit and submit a personal information processing risk 
assessment to the California Privacy Protection Agency.218 
 The CPRA places limits on the collection, storage, use, 
and retention of personal information that is reasonably necessary and 
proportionate to achieve the desired end of collecting the personal 
information in the first place.219 The CPRA increased the fine to $7,500 
per violation involving individuals under 16 years of age.220 There is 
no longer a 30-day cure period following notice of a breach.221 Finally, 
the CPRA expanded the scope of a consumer privacy right of action so 
that violations of email accounts are now covered.222 Thus, the CCPA, 
together with the CPRA, is currently looking a lot like the GDPR in 
terms of enforcement, opt-in and opt-out restrictions, scope, the 
meaning of personal information, and the rights of access, correction, 
deletion, disclosure, erasure, as well as portability, penalties, and 
verification.223 
C. Nevada’s Privacy Law 
On May 29, 2019, the Nevada Senate approved Senate Bill 
(SB-220), which amended Nevada’s existing privacy law from 2017 or 
NRS 603A.300 – 603A.360 and became effective on October 1, 
2019.224 SB-220 gave consumers the right to opt out to sell their 
personal information.225 
The Nevada privacy law concerns “operators” who are defined 
as any person that meets the following criteria: (1) owns and operates 
a website or online service as a business, (2) collects and maintains 
personal information from consumers who reside in Nevada and who 
access the website or online service, and (3) focuses its activities on 
Nevada, conducts a transaction in Nevada, or purposefully avails itself 
of performing its activities in Nevada.226 In terms of the Nevada privacy 
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law, personal information consists of a person’s first and last name, 
social security number, driver’s license number or identification card 
number, account number, credit card number, debit card number, or 
any other identifier that permits an individual to be contacted either 
physically or online.227 
The Nevada privacy law applies to  persons that (1) advertise 
their products or services in Nevada, (2) ship their products or services 
to Nevada, or (3) sell their products or services to Nevada citizens.228 
The Nevada privacy law does not apply if (1) a person or entity is 
located in Nevada, (2) the revenue of the person or entity primarily 
comes from a source other than selling goods or services on its website 
or online service, and (3) the website or online service has less than 
20,000 unique visitors per year.229 
Companies that satisfy the Nevada privacy law must create and 
maintain an expressed privacy policy document that (1) categorizes the 
personal information that is collected and the third parties to whom 
such information is shared, (2) describes the process, if it exists, for a 
user to be notified and to review and request changes to the collected 
personal information, (3) informs a user whether a third party is 
collecting personal information through different websites, (4) lists the 
effective date of the privacy policy.230 SB-220 requires a person or an 
entity to create a designated request address, either a physical address, 
email address, toll-free telephone number, or website where an 
individual can submit a request.231 This information must be published 
on the website’s privacy policy statement, and a person or entity must 
respond to the request within 60 days of receiving the request.232 The 
penalty for non-compliance is at most $5,000 per violation.233 
According to Jordan, although SB-220 covers a wide range of 
information, the scope of Nevada’s privacy law is much narrower than 
the GDPR and the CCPA.234 SB-220 does provide consumers with the 
right to request that their personal information not be sold to third 
parties.235 
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D. Maine’s Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer 
Information 
On July 1, 2020, Maine became the next state to regulate online 
data.236 Like the Nevada privacy law, the Maine privacy law is not a 
comprehensive privacy law like the CCPA.237 However, in contrast to 
the California and Nevada privacy laws, the Maine law focuses 
exclusively on data collected by Internet Service Providers (ISPs).238 
The Maine law prevents ISPs from disclosing, selling, or permitting 
access to customer personal information.239 According to the Maine 
privacy law, customers include applicants for service, current 
subscribers, and former subscribers of ISPs.240 The law protects a 
customer’s name, address, social security number, billing address, and 
demographic data.241 It also safeguards web browsing history, 
application use history, precise geolocation data, financial data, health 
data, information on the customer’s children, the customer’s device 
identifiers, the content of customer communications, and origin and 
destination IP addresses.242 An ISP may use, disclose, sell, or allow 
access to personal information only if a customer consents.243 A 
consumer may withdraw their consent at any time.244 
An ISP is not permitted to refuse service to a customer when 
the customer does not consent, charge a customer for not providing 
consent, or give a customer a discount for consenting.245 As for 
information that is not personal information, an ISP may use, disclose, 
sell, or allow access, provided that a customer does not give written 
notice to the ISP that they do not agree to such actions.246 Even so, an 
ISP may collect, retain, use, disclose, sell, or allow access to customer 
information to provide Internet service, to advertise or market services, 
to comply with a legal court order, to bill and collect payment, to 
protect customers from fraud and other abuses, and to provide 
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geolocation data in an emergency to law enforcement, a customer’s 
legal guardian or family member, or for assisting in an emergency 
response.247 
E. Virginia’s Consumer Data Protection Act 
On March 2, 2021, Governor Ralph Northam signed the 
Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (CDPA) into law.248 According 
to Horner, the CDPA establishes a framework for controlling and 
processing personal data in Virginia.249 The law applies to all persons 
that conduct business in the state, and either (1) control or process 
personal data of at least 100,000 consumers or (2) obtain over 50 
percent of gross revenue from the sale of personal data and control or 
process personal data of more than 25,000 consumers.250 The law does 
not apply to state or local government entities and possesses exceptions 
for specific types of data or information that are governed by federal 
law.251 The law gives consumers the rights to access, correct, delete, 
and copy personal data.252 Under Virginia law, a consumer has the right 
to opt-out of the processing of personal data for targeted advertising, 
the sale of personal data, or the profiling of the consumer and the right 
to appeal the decision of an entity’s data controller.253 The CDPA states 
that the Virginia Attorney General possesses the exclusive authority to 
enforce any violations of the law.254 The CDPA established the 
Virginia Joint Commission on Technology and Science (VJCTS) to 
support the Virginia Attorney General’s efforts.255 The Virginia 
legislature charged the VJCTS with reviewing the act’s provisions,.256 
The effective date of the CDPA is January 1, 2023.257 
According to Rippy, the scope of the CDPA is controlled by 
the definitions of the terms “consumer,” “sale of personal information,” 
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and “monetary and other valuable consideration.”258 According to the 
CDPA, a consumer is a natural person that resides in Virginia that acts 
as an individual or in the context of a household.259 In contrast to the 
CCPA, the CDPA does not include employee data that may be 
collected by businesses.260 The CDPA defines valuable consideration 
strictly as money exchanged when data is sold with the following 
exceptions: (1) disclosures to processors, (2) disclosures to third parties 
where a consumer requested a product or service, (3) disclosures to an 
affiliate of a controller, (4) unrestricted disclosures by consumers to the 
public via mass media, and (5) disclosures due to mergers, acquisitions, 
etc.261 The entity exemptions include (1) a Virginia agency, board, 
bureau, commission, district, or political subdivision, (2) a financial 
institution that is subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, (3) an entity 
subject to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act, (4) a nonprofit organization, and (5) an institution of higher 
learning such as a college or university.262 Much like the GDPR and 
the CCPA, the CDPA has provisions that limit the collection and use 
of data, mandates technical safeguards, and require data protection 
assessments, data processing agreements, and a privacy policy.263 
Unfortunately, the CDPA has specified neither a time 
requirement regarding disclosures of personal information to a 
consumer nor the format used in disclosing personal information to a 
consumer.264 The CDPA does not provide for a private right of 
action.265 Even so, when the Virginia Attorney General chooses to take 
legal action against an entity, the entity’s data controller has 30 days to 
either cure the violation and provide the Attorney General with a 
written statement that the breach has been fixed.266 If an entity selects 
not to cure a violation, the Virginia Attorney General may fine the 
entity up to $7,500 per violation.267 
      














F. Colorado’s Privacy Act 
On July 8, 2021, the Colorado Privacy Act (CPA) officially 
became law.268 According to Rippy, the CPA is similar to the CCPA 
and the CDPA but with some distinct differences.269 The CPA pertains 
to any controller that conducts business in Colorado, produces products 
or services for Colorado residents, controls data for at least 100,000 
customers annually, or obtains revenue or a discount on the price of 
goods or services from selling personal customer data.270 According to 
the CPA, there are no revenue minimums, but the law does concern 
companies that process the personal information of 25,000 or more 
customers and gets revenue or a discount from the sale of that data.271 
Also, the CPA defined a consumer as a Colorado resident that acts as 
an individual or in the context of a household but omitted peopled 
acting in a commercial or employment context such as a job 
applicant.272 
The CPA defines a sale of personal information as an exchange 
of personal data for money or other valuable consideration.273 
However, a sale does not include the (1) disclosure of personal data to 
a processor that processes personal data for the processor, (2) 
disclosure of personal data to a third party for delivering a product or 
service that a consumer asks for, (3) disclosure or transfer of personal 
data to a controller’s affiliate, (4) disclosure or transfer of personal data 
that is part of a merger or bankruptcy, or (5) disclosure of personal data 
where the controller is directed by the consumer to make the personal 
data available to a third party or the general public.274 
The CPA excuses the entity-level exemptions and data-level 
exemptions.275 For example, an entity-level exemption would consist 
of entities that are subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, but did not 
fully exempt entities that are covered by the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA).276 Furthermore, under the 
CPA, the six primary consumer rights include the right of access, the 
right to correct data inaccuracies, the right to delete personal data, the 
right to obtain personal information in a portable format, the right to 
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opt-out of processing of personal customer data, and the right to appeal 
with a reasonable time when a business denies a customer’s request.277 
The law demands that the Colorado attorney general establish technical 
standards before July 1, 2023.278 
A data controller has the duty (1) to expressly specify why 
personal information is being collected, (20 to avoid the secondary use 
of personal data, (3) of care that is appropriate to the volume, scope, 
and nature of the personal information being collected, (4) to avoid 
unlawful discrimination, (5) to avert processing sensitive data without 
customer consent, (6) to assess whether a data processing activity 
presents a heightened risk of harm to a consumer; and (7) to require 
that a processor be governed by a contract between a controller and a 
processor.279 Unlike the other privacy acts discussed above, the CPA 
gave the attorney general and district attorneys the authority to enforce 
the Colorado privacy law.280 Once legal action is initiated, a controller 
has 60 to cure a violation, which is twice the time allotted by the 
California and Virginia cure period.281 The 60-day cure period will 
cease beginning January 1, 2025.282 There are no penalties in the CPA 
because a violation of the law is considered to be deceptive trade 
practice, where the Colorado Consumer Protection Act ensures that the 
maximum is $20,000 per violation.283 
G. Status of Privacy Bills in the Several States 
As one can see from the discussion above, there are as of this 
writing five states, California, Nevada, Maine, Virginia, and Colorado, 
that have passed privacy laws. According to Rippy, six states are 
currently in the process of legislating privacy laws.284 Also, sixteen 
states have had privacy bills that failed to be passed by their respective 
legislatures.285 By implication, as of September 1, 2021, the legislatures 
of 23 states are not currently considering a privacy bill. This 
information implies that privacy legislation may be quickly becoming 
a serious issue in the United States. 
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IV. BIOMETRIC PRIVACY LAWS IN THE SEVERAL STATES 
In this section of this essay, Illinois’ Biometric Information 
Privacy Act, Texas’ Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, and 
Washington’s Biometric Identifiers Act will be discussed in turn. The 
states with minor changes in existing law to accommodate the 
protection of biometric identifiers and states where biometric privacy 
bills are under legislative review will also be examined. 
A. Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act 
In 2008, the Biometric Information Privacy Act became law in 
the State of Illinois. It was a comprehensive law that more or less laid 
dormant until the Illinois Supreme Court opined in Rosenbach.286 An 
example of a case involving BIPA before Rosenbach is Rivera. The 
Court held that Google’s retention of unique face templates did not 
cause the type of concrete injury to individuals required to establish 
standing.287 The Court observed that Google, Inc.’s creation, without 
consent, of unique face templates did not cause a concrete injury as 
required for standing.288 Thus, there was no BIPA violation. 
With the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenbach, a 
proliferation of cases occurred.289 Rosenbach originated when a 
fourteen-year-old boy, Alexander Rosenbach, went on a field trip to 
Six Flags Great America in Gurnee, Illinois.290 His mother, Stacy 
Rosenbach, purchased a ticket for her son online.291 When entering Six 
Flags, Alexander was required to scan his thumbprint to verify his 
identity and activate his season pass.292 Alexander did not receive any 
paperwork describing either the reasons for why the thumbprint scan 
was taken or how the biometric data would be stored, used, or 
disseminated.293 When Alexander returned home, he told his mother 
about the scan print.294 Six Flags did not send Alexander or his mother 
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a consent form regarding taking a scan of Alexander’s thumbprint.295 
Six Flags did not reveal its policy regarding its biometric information 
storage policies to the plaintiffs.296 
In Rosenbach, the Court reversed the appellate court’s ruling, 
finding a technical violation of BIPA. There was no showing of actual 
damages in the lower court that gave rise to a cause of action.297 
However, the Court employed the statute's plain meaning to opine that 
a plaintiff’s standing under BIPA is not controlled by actual harm but 
rather by an invasion and infringement of a statutory right, which in 
turn gave rise to the cause of action.298 The decision of the Court was 
unanimous.299 
Rosenbach resulted in an increase in biometric litigation in 
Illinois.300 In Rogers, the plaintiffs were an “aggrieved person” within 
the meaning of BIPA.301 The plaintiffs adequately stated a claim for 
violations of the Illinois law.302 However, the plaintiffs failed to allege 
that the defendant’s actions were intentional and reckless, as required 
for heightened damages.303 In Namuwonge, the plaintiffs sufficiently 
alleged that Kronos, Inc. possessed fingerprint data collected by the 
company within the meaning of BIPA.304 The plaintiffs stated a claim 
against Kronos for the violation of  BIPA that required Kronos to 
develop a written policy when in possession of biometric identifiers.305 
The plaintiffs did not state a claim against Kronos for a violation of 
BIPA, which limited transfers of biometric information.306 The 
plaintiffs did not state a claim against Kronos, Inc. for a violation of 
BIPA that required a company collecting or capturing a person’s 
biometric information to inform the individual in writing.307 Finally, 
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the plaintiffs’ abstract statements regarding damages were insufficient 
for the federal district court to infer that the company acted recklessly 
or intentionally.308 
In Bryant, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the collection of 
customer fingerprints without first obtaining written consent, which 
BIPA required, was an injury that was sufficient to satisfy the injury-
in-fact requirement for standing.309 According to the Court, the failure 
to disclose a written retention schedule and destruction guidelines 
publicly violated BIPA, whereas no injury was sufficient to confer 
standing before collecting fingerprints.310 
In Snider, Snider had the standing to bring BIPA claims for 
Heartland Beef’s failure to inform and failure to obtain written 
consent.311 However, Snider lacked standing to assert a claim that 
Heartland Beef was unable to create and publicize its policy regarding 
retention and destruction of its biometric identifiers defense.312 The 
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act did not preempt Snider’s BIPA 
claims because Snider pled a plausible BIPA claim against the 
Heartland Beef defense.313 Finally, Snider sufficiently alleged 
Heartland Beef’s negligence, where an implied assumption of risk was 
not an applicable defense.314 In Campbell, the Ninth Circuit opined that 
the plaintiffs in the class-action suit had sufficiently alleged concrete 
injury-in-fact to satisfy standing.315 The federal district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it determined that class certification’s 
predominant requirement was met.316 Finally, the federal district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it opined that class certification’s 
superiority requirement was met.317 
In Fox, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal district court’s 
remand order back to state court was appealable.318 Dakkota Integrated 
Systems’ alleged violation of BIPA was an injury-in-fact that 
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supported Fox’s claim for standing under Article III.319 The alleged 
violation consisted of failing to develop, publicly disclose, and comply 
with a data-retention schedule and guidelines for the permanent 
destruction of biometric data after the initial purpose for collection 
ended.320 
In Figueroa, the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a concrete 
informational injury to confer Article III standing.321 Kronos was 
obliged to obtain a written release from its employees before acquiring 
biometric data.322 The plaintiffs claimed that Kronos violated the BIPA 
section that required private organizations who obtained biometric data 
to inform its employees that the company was collecting biometric data 
without receiving a written release.323 The Court noted that Kronos 
disseminated employee biometric data without the plaintiffs’ 
knowledge or consent.324 The plaintiffs adequately alleged negligence 
required to state a claim for statutory damages under BIPA.325 Finally, 
potential fact questions concerning various timekeeping practices of 
Kronos did not warrant striking the class allegations at the pleading 
stage.326 It was premature at the pleading stage to strike class 
allegations based on the vendor’s claim that named plaintiffs were 
inadequate class representatives.327  
In Cothron, the plaintiffs’ alleged injury was caused by White 
Castle’s violation of BIPA, which requires an organization, before 
collecting biometric data, to inform an employee in writing that the 
information is being collected or stored.328 The organization must also 
state the specific purpose and length of term for collecting, storing, and 
using the data.329 An employer must receive a written release from the 
individual.330 In other words, the plaintiffs had Article III standing.331 
The plaintiffs did not allege a violation or suffer an injury under BIPA 
that required the defendant that possessed the biometric data to delete 
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that data as soon as the purpose of the collection was satisfied or within 
three years after the last interaction with the relevant person.332 This 
meant that the plaintiffs did not have Article III standing to bring a 
claim based on this provision of BIPA.333 
The plaintiffs’ alleged injury, which was caused by the 
defendant’s violation of a provision of BIPA that states that an 
organization in possession of biometric data may only disclose or 
otherwise disseminate an individual’s data on obtaining the person’s 
consent or in limited other circumstances, was concrete and 
particularized.334 This means that the plaintiffs possess Article III 
standing to sue for such alleged violation.335 The consent form that the 
plaintiffs signed did not equitably estop the plaintiffs, under Illinois 
law, from bringing this action.336 The plaintiffs’ failure to specifically 
allege the defendant’s mental state did not require dismissal.337 It did 
not matter the time at which consent was statutorily required under the 
provision of BIPA, which states that an organization that possesses 
biometric data may only disclose or otherwise disseminate a person’s 
data upon obtaining the person’s consent or in limited other 
circumstances.338 The plaintiffs pleaded information that triggered his 
or her suspicion of disseminating their biometric data without 
consent.339 Thus, the plaintiffs stated a plausible claim, even though 
some of the allegations were alleged upon information and belief.340 
In Sherman, the plaintiffs alleged a concrete injury sufficient to 
establish Article III standing because Brandt Industries failed to 
institute, maintain, and adhere to a publicly available retention 
schedule and failed to obtain informed written consent before 
collecting biometric information.341 The plaintiffs could seek 
liquidated damages under BIPA.342 The Illinois Workers’ 
Compensation Act did not preempt the plaintiffs’ suit.343 
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Finally, in Thornley, the defendant collected Thornley’s 
biometric data via photographs and metadata that were procured using 
social media websites such as Facebook, Venmo, and YouTube.344 
Clearview proceeded to compile the biometric data and then sold it to 
third parties.345 Thornley contended that Clearview violated Section 
15(c) of BIPA, prohibiting private organizations from selling, leasing, 
trading, or profiting from an individual’s biometric identifiers.346 The 
Seventh Circuit opined that Thornley did not experience an Article III 
injury from the sale of his biometric data.347 The Court concluded that 
by ensuring that the supply of biometric identifiers is illegal, Section 
15(c) prevented a market for biometric identifiers from existing.348 The 
Court likened Section 15(c) to Section 15(a), which prohibited entities 
from collecting biometric identifiers without issuing data retention and 
destruction policies.349 In other words, a defendant owed a duty to the 
public-at-large rather than to an individual plaintiff, absent a positive 
allegation of a specific injury.350 
B. Texas’ Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act 
In 2009, one year after BIPA was passed, the Texas legislature 
passed Chapter 503 of Title 11, Subtitle A as amended, the Texas 
biometric privacy law, also known as the Capture or Use of Biometric 
Identifier (CUBI) Act.351 The law is approximately one and one-half 
pages long.352 The law protects the confidentiality of biometric 
identifiers by restricting their collection, sale, lease, or disclosure but 
does not contain a broader definition of biometric information.353 
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According to Section 503.001, a biometric identifier means a retina or 
iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or a record of the geometry of a face 
or hand.354 The Texas law does not cover a voiceprint if a financial 
institution or an affiliate retains it because 15 U.S.C. Section 6809 
defines those terms.355 CUBI does not require a written release, but 
does demand that firms destroy data that are no longer needed, and 
compels businesses to destroy that data “no later than the first 
anniversary of the data the purpose for collecting the identifier expires, 
except as provided by Subsection (c-1)”.356 CUBI does not permit a 
private cause of action but only allows the Texas Attorney General to 
begin legal proceedings.357  
C. Washington’s Biometric Identifiers Act 
On July 23, 2017, Washington became the third state to pass a 
biometric privacy law called the Biometric Identifiers Act (BIA).358 
Under the Washington law, a biometric identifier is similar to the Texas 
definition of a biometric identifier, but BIA does not possess an express 
definition of biometric information.359 In contrast to BIPA and CUBI, 
the Washington law does have a security clause where biometric 
identifiers may be collected for the purpose of “preventing shoplifting, 
fraud, or any other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value, 
including tangible and intangible goods, services, and other purposes 
in furtherance of protecting the security or integrity of software, 
accounts, applications, online services, or any person.”360  
Like Texas, the BIA does not require that consent be in writing, 
nor does the law create a private cause of action, but only permits the 
Washington Attorney General to instigate legal proceedings.361 Finally, 
the Washington biometric privacy law does allow businesses to sell 
biometric identifiers except under seven specific circumstances that, 
under a careful reading, appear to subsume the rule.362  
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D. Amendments to Existing Arkansas and New York State 
Laws 
Zych and his colleagues wrote that on August 9, 2019, 
Arkansas amended its definition of the personal information contained 
in its data breach response law to encompass biometric data, such as 
voiceprint, handprint, fingerprint, DNA, a retina or iris scan, hand 
geometry, faceprint, or another unique biological characteristic.363 
Accordingly, Arkansas businesses that acquire, own, or license 
personal information are now required to implement and maintain 
“reasonable and appropriate security practices to protect data from 
unauthorized access or disclosure.”364 In February 2020, the State of 
New York revised its definition of personal information in its Stop 
Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security Act to include biometric 
data that may be employed to authenticate or ascertain a person’s 
identity.365 
E. Pending Biometric Privacy Bills in New York and 
Maryland 
According to Lust and his colleagues, on January 6, 2021, the 
first day of the New York legislature’s 2021 session, New York state 
representatives proposed Assembly Bill 27 (AB 27), the New York 
Biometric Privacy Act.366They reported that the bill’s purpose is to 
ensure that companies have a written biometric retention policy.367 The 
bill would require that non-governmental organizations with biometric 
information generate a written retention policy that specifies the initial 
purpose of acquiring personal information and when this purpose has 
been satisfied.368 According to the New York bill, a private entity must 
destroy that biometric information within three years of last interacting 
with an individual.369 
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Shortly after New York state representatives proposed 
Assembly Bill 27 (AB 27), Maryland introduced House Bill 218, a bill 
that seemingly cloned the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act.370 Like 
Illinois’ BIPA, the Maryland bill assures that individuals have a private 
right of action, statutory penalties and that plaintiffs can recover 
attorney fees when the litigation is successful.371 Given the tidal wave 
of class action suits in Illinois, the modeling of Maryland’s biometric 
bill on Illinois’ BIPA demonstrates that Maryland employers must 
scrutinize biometric technology and litigation to avoid possible class 
action suits in the future.372 
The Maryland bill title is entitled  “Commercial Law – 
Consumer Protection – Biometric Identifiers and Biometric 
Information Privacy.”373 The Maryland bill forbids private 
organizations from capturing, collecting, or storing an individual’s 
biometric information without first having a biometric policy 
document and acquiring written consent, implements standards of care, 
and prohibits biometric information disclosure without consent.374 
Under the Maryland bill, the available remedies are similar to the 
remedies contained in Illinois’ BIPA.375 An individual can recover 
$1,000 for each negligent violation and $5,00 for each intentional or 
reckless violation, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.376 
The difference between Illinois’ BIPA and the Maryland bill is 
that biometric identifiers under the Maryland law extend to data about 
an individual that is created by automatic measurements of that 
person’s biological characteristics, including fingerprints, genetic 
print, iris, or retina scan, voiceprint, etc.377 The Maryland bill possesses 
a broader definition of biometric information.378 It includes any 
information that can be used to identify an individual, regardless of 
how it is obtained, converted, stored, or shared.379 However, under the 
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Maryland bill, biometric information does not include any information 
that is excluded under its definition of a biometric identifier, such as 
photographs, information captured from a health care setting, 
operations, payment, or treatment under HIPAA.380 Finally, under the 
Maryland bill, a company’s policy regarding the retention and 
destruction of biometric information does not need to see the light of 
day if the policy applies only to the employees of a private organization 
and is employed only for internal use.381 If Maryland passes its 
biometric privacy bill, it remains to be seen whether Maryland will 
experience a similar cascade of class action suits like those currently 
being filed in Illinois.382 
Finally, based on the experiences of Illinois’ BIPA and the New 
York and Maryland legislators, it can be expected that other states may 
soon follow the lead of Illinois, New York, and Maryland. 
F. Summary of the Literature Reviewed 
The first privacy test originated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
in Katz.383 The General Data Protection Regulation became law in 
2018.384 It is a comprehensive law that includes biometric privacy. The 
principal case that tested the EU Directive was Costeja González.385 
The CJEU held that Google Spain and Google, Inc. must eradicate links 
to web pages that are freely accessible worldwide when individuals 
whose personal information is contained therein demand that the links 
be removed.386 For the United States, the California Consumer Privacy 
Act is a comprehensive privacy law as amended by the California 
Privacy Rights Act.387 Several states are creating their versions of the 
CCPA, much like how the Virginia law was modeled after the CCPA 
as amended.388 Currently, there is no comprehensive federal privacy 
law in the United States.389  
The first state in the United States to pass a comprehensive 
biometric privacy law was Illinois.390 The law was entitled the 
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Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).391 One of the consequences 
of BIPA has been a tidal wave of suits because BIPA permits private 
action rather than limiting actions to be filed only by the Illinois 
Attorney General.392 Texas and Washington have their biometric 
privacy law versions, but the laws in these states are by no means as 
all-inclusive as the Illinois law.393 Arkansas and New York recently 
amended their existing state laws to protect biometric information.394 
Finally, as of this writing, the legislatures of both New York and 
Maryland are in the process of evaluating their renderings of biometric 
privacy law.395  
V. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
The purpose of this study was to understand and evaluate the 
privacy and property issues that states confront that are inherent from 
the use of biometrics to enhance corporate security in their efforts to 
protect individual privacy. The research examined the historical legal 
foundations of privacy, focusing on the GDPR, the CCPA as amended 
by the CPRA, and Illinois’ BIPA. The research also discussed the 
existing privacy and biometric privacy laws by indicating the states 
where privacy and biometric privacy legislation are under review by 
various state legislatures. The research addressed the following 
questions: (1) What are the biometric privacy issues that states face 
regarding individual and corporate needs for security and privacy?; (2) 
Why do several states continue to be vulnerable to litigation regarding 
biometric privacy issues?; (3) How does the State of Illinois address 
biometric privacy issues in its statutory effort to protect the individuals 
against organizations that employ biometric cybersecurity 
procedures?; and (4) How does the Illinois Biometric Information 
Privacy Act benefit the federal government and other states in their 
efforts to create and pass biometric privacy laws that protect the 
privacy rights of their citizens? 
The research described the history of privacy, why it is 
important, and what harms individuals experience when their privacy 
is violated. The research also described the content of the GDPR and 
the content of the CCPA as amended by the CPRA. The study outlined 
Illinois’ BIPA, explaining what biometric information is and what it is 
not. Finally, the essay delineated the privacy and biometric privacy 
laws in other states and indicated what states were in the process of 
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evaluating bills that specifically addressed privacy and biometric 
privacy. 
A. Individual and Corporate Privacy Needs 
The fundamental issue that states face regarding individual and 
corporate needs for security and privacy is how to protect the 
confidentiality of personal information while ensuring that entities 
employ their tools appropriately to safeguard corporate tangible and 
intangible property. In the United States, individuals have a legally 
recognized reasonable expectation of privacy and specific privacy 
rights by statute.396 Companies should be able to buy or sell individual 
personal information without expressed prior consent. On the other 
hand, companies need to ensure that their tangible and intangible 
property is safe from individuals who may misappropriate or misuse 
corporate assets. Like in Rosenbach, firms need to make sure that 
customers only receive the goods and services they pay for and not for 
biometric data collection.397 Once an organization collects personal 
data, an entity is responsible for ensuring that the personal information 
is held in privity and not accessible to unauthorized third parties. 
B. Vulnerabilities to Litigation 
There are several reasons why states are vulnerable to litigation 
regarding privacy in general and biometric privacy in particular. For 
states that have not passed privacy or biometric privacy legislation such 
as the CCPA or Illinois’ BIPA, the following four distinct privacy torts 
described by Prosser are the unreasonable intrusion upon another’s 
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light invasion of 
privacy, and appropriation of another’s name or likeness.398 These torts 
are available for litigants whether the privacy issue at hand deals with 
personal information or biometric information. For the states that have 
passed privacy or biometric privacy laws, any vulnerabilities to 
litigation are expressed in the respective statutes. In particular, for 
Illinois under BIPA, individuals have the legal right to instigate private 
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action.399 In contrast, only the Attorneys General of the respective 
states can sue private entities in Texas and Washington.400  
C. Protecting Individual Biometric Privacy 
Illinois addresses biometric privacy issues in multiple ways. 
First, BIPA explicitly defines biometric information as physiological 
characteristics related to the shape of the body, such as fingerprints, 
palm veins, face recognition, DNA, palm prints, hand geometry, iris 
recognition, retina, and odor or scent.401 BIPA also states what is not 
biometric information, such as writing samples, photographs, tattoos, 
height, weight, hair color, X-rays, or mammography.402 Second, 
Illinois’ BIPA through Rosenbach showed that a plaintiff does not have 
to experience actual damages to sue a defendant to establish a BIPA 
violation.403  Finally, instead of giving only a State’s Attorney General 
the legal authority to sue an entity, such as in Texas and Washington, 
Illinois permits private action.404 
D. Biometric Privacy and the Federal Government 
Based on the research above, it is apparent that the CCPA, as 
amended by the CPRA, is currently the model privacy law in the United 
States. It is also evident that Illinois’ BIPA is the model biometric 
privacy law in the country. Both the CCPA, as amended by the CPRA, 
and BIPA are extensive pieces of legislation that precisely define an 
individual’s privacy and biometric privacy rights. A significant 
limitation of both laws is that the content of the CCPA as amended by 
the CPRA does not overlap with the content of Illinois’ BIPA. Unlike 
Article 14(4) of the GDPR, which explicitly covers both Internet and 
computer-based privacy rights as well as biometric privacy rights.405 In 
the text that follows, it is argued that what is needed in the United States 
is a comprehensive privacy law, much like the GDPR, but tuned to the 
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political nuances that exist in America. To this end, the CCPA, as 
amended by the CPRA and Illinois’ BIPA, can be employed in the 
development and passage by Congress of an inclusive and far-reaching 
federal privacy law. 
E. Recommendations 
1. First Recommendation 
Here are some of the recommendations that come out of the 
research discussed above. First and foremost is the need for a federal 
privacy law, much like the CCPA as amended by the CPRA, 
encompassing biometric privacy. The critical issue is who owns the 
data collected when an individual provides their data to a corporation 
or local, state, or federal government. In the law, a person only 
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy as defined by Supreme 
Court case law and by specific statutes, such as the Americans with 
Disability Act.406 In Carpenter and the preceding cases discussed 
herein, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy when the 
local, state, and federal government access an individual’s cell phone 
metadata.407 There were four distinct minority opinions in Carpenter, 
three of whom contended that there is no privacy without property 
rights.408 In Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, he opined that cell phone 
providers, the organizations that collect, store, use, and disseminate cell 
phone metadata, are bailees entrusted by the cell phone owners with 
the metadata generated by the cell phones that the cell phone owners 
own.409  
What is apparent from the case law is that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test and the notion that privacy can only exist 
when property rights are present are antithetical. The first 
recommendation of this essay is that synthesis must occur, merging 
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the privacy is property 
notion into a cohesive whole so that individual privacy is protected by 
law. Dialectical reasoning must be employed to achieve this goal, 
blending the reasonable expectation of privacy thesis and the privacy 
as property antithesis, creating the synthesis as implied in Justice 
Gorsuch’s dissent in Carpenter, where the entities that collect, store, 
use, and disseminate personal information are bailees.410 Once this is 
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achieved, biometric privacy loses its importance as an issue in itself but 
is transformed into a special case of privacy rights in general. 
2. Second Recommendation 
The second and succeeding recommendations address the 
mechanics of how a federal privacy law should and ought to function. 
What is covered under the proposed federal privacy law, and probably 
more importantly, what is not covered, must be stated explicitly in the 
proposed rule and not left to the courts’ discretion. Presuming that a 
federal privacy law encompasses biometric privacy, a proposed federal 
privacy law, like BIPA, should and ought to explicitly state what 
personal information is protected and what is not. For example, under 
BIPA, fingerprints, palm veins, face recognition, DNA, palm prints, 
hand geometry, iris recognition, retina, and odor or scent are all 
physiological characteristics that are protected.411 Behavioral factors 
associated with behavior patterns, including typing rhythm, gait, 
keystroke, signature, behavioral profiling, and voice, are also protected 
under BIPA.412  
The Biometric Information Privacy Act states that biometric 
information is not “writing samples, written signatures, photographs, 
human biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, 
demographic data, tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as 
height, weight, hair color, or eye color.”413 Biometric information is 
also not “donated organs, tissues, or parts, … blood or serum stored on 
behalf of recipients or potential recipients of living or cadaveric 
transplants and obtained or stored by a federally designated organ 
procurement agency.”414 Biometric identifiers are not regulated 
biological materials (specifically, in Illinois, the Genetic Information 
Privacy Act of 2020), information captured from a patient in a health 
care setting, or information collected, used, or stored for health care 
treatment, payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act.415 Finally, biometric identifiers do 
not involve “an X-ray, roentgen process, computed tomography, MRI, 
PET scan, mammography, or other image or film of the human 
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anatomy used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or other medical 
condition or to further validate scientific testing or screening 
agency.”416 
Illinois’ BIPA is quite specific to what constitutes protected 
biometric information and what information about an individual is not 
covered. When passing a federal privacy law, it can be expected that 
legislators will engage in considerable wrangling about what to protect 
and what not to protect. Such negotiations are an integral part of the 
negotiation process in voting on a bill to make a law. It is reasonable 
to expect that such infighting will naturally occur. Although there is a 
case to be made for the proposed federal law to contain a general 
definition of personal information, leaving the particulars up to the 
courts to decide, the risk of having a general definition of what 
constitutes protected personal information, biometric or otherwise, is 
that the Supreme Court could rule that the proposed federal privacy law 
is unconstitutional for vagueness. Thus, the second recommendation is 
that the proposed federal privacy law specifically describe what is and 
what is not protected personal and biometric information. 
3. Third Recommendation 
When a violation occurs of the proposed federal privacy law, 
damages need to be considered. Currently, in Illinois, when a technical 
breach of BIPA happens, Illinois courts cite Rosenbach to conclude 
that there is sufficient support for a cause of action, even if an 
individual has not experienced a loss of biometric privacy.417 When 
considering a proposed federal privacy law, the mere presence of a 
violation could trigger the law, or the law could be invoked when a 
third party uses personal information for nefarious, presumably illegal 
ends. This is a difficult question to answer. If the proposed federal 
privacy law advocates the former, then the consequences may have a 
significant negative economic impact not foreseen by Congress. On the 
other hand, if the latter is contained in the proposed federal privacy law, 
there may be many instances where common sense privacy violations 
materialize without a legal remedy. Thus, the third recommendation is 
that a balancing test should be created where an offense transpires only 
when the harm to an individual outweighs the effect of a technical 
violation. 
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4. Fourth Recommendation 
Next, there is the issue of damages to be addressed. The CCPA 
specifies two types of non-compliance penalties. According to the 
CCPA, the damages are at most $750 per violation or the actual 
damages, whatever is the greater amount.418 The Attorney General of 
California may enforce the privacy provision of the CCPA via civil 
penalties with a maximum of $7,500 per violation.419 For example, it is 
not uncommon for a data breach to involve one million individuals. At 
$750 per violation, the maximum penalty would be $750 million, 
whereas if the Attorney General of California decides to sue the entity, 
the maximum penalty would be $7.5 billion.420 The problem with the 
massive amount of money that the federal government could extract 
from a private organization is that few entities could afford to pay the 
fine and remain in existence. It is quite possible that in the presence of 
such huge fines, a company would simply declare Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. The result would be putting tens of thousands of 
employees out of work, if not hundreds of thousands. It is apparent that 
if the proposed federal privacy law were to follow the CCPA’s 
example, one of the economic consequences could be a downturn in 
the economy or even a recession. Thus, the fourth recommendation is 
that the proposed federal privacy law employ a sliding scale of 
damages, where the penalty is directly proportional to the number of 
individual violations. 
5. Final Recommendation 
The final recommendation deals with the volume of individual 
and class action suits that could be filed with the passage of federal 
privacy law. As was previously observed, the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rosenbach generated a tidal wave of cases because BIPA 
permits private action.421 In contrast, only the states’ Attorneys General 
can begin legal proceedings in both Texas and Washington. Given that 
the Texas and Washington biometric privacy laws were passed several 
years after Illinois’ BIPA was signed into law, the probable reason that 
Texas and Washington allow only their Attorneys General to instigate 
legal proceedings is that the respective state legislators do not want to 
clog their state judiciary systems with a host of private actions, like 
what is happening in Illinois. Private action is critical because, without 
the ability of individuals to sue an offending entity, the proposed 
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federal privacy law would be a toothless tiger. Suppose individuals 
must rely exclusively on a federal agency to sue an offending 
organization. In general, given the limited resources of federal 
agencies, there is a distinctly significant probability that the proposed 
federal agency will decide not to pursue litigation, thereby denying 
justice to aggrieved persons. This would be an untenable situation, 
leaving wronged individuals without an adequate legal remedy from a 
civil rights perspective. Thus, a balance must be struck between 
individual rights of redress and judicial efficiency. 
One such solution has its roots in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
as amended, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.422 
It is proposed that the proposed federal privacy law establish a 
commission responsible for evaluating whether litigation will be filed 
against an organization that violated an individual’s privacy or 
biometric privacy rights. An individual or a class of individuals could 
file a complaint with this commission, claiming that a private 
organization violated an individual’s or class of individuals’ privacy 
rights. It is suggested that the commission have 180 days to evaluate 
whether it will sue the offending entity.  
At the end of the 180 days, the commission would release a 
right-to-sue letter to the complainants(s) if the commission decided not 
to sue. The claimant(s) would then have 540 days after receiving the 
right to sue letter to file suit against the offending organization. The 
statute of limitations would start running for individual lawsuits after 
the person became knowingly aware that the privacy violation 
occurred. The statute of limitations for a class action would begin after 
the class’s principal representative became knowingly aware that the 
privacy violations happened. This final recommendation seemingly 
balances the rights of individuals to pursue private actions against 
offending organizations and the likely desire of Congress to ensure that 
the federal court system is not overly burdened with privacy litigation. 
F. Summary 
This research summarized the privacy and biometric privacy 
laws both in the European Union and the United States. The project 
observed that the United States sorely lacks a federal privacy law that 
encompasses the handling by companies of personal information and 
biometric information. It was proposed that the United States pass an 
all-inclusive privacy law that would act as a floor to the state privacy 
laws that currently exist and to the privacy bills being considered by 
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the legislatures of the several states. Here, the research answered the 
questions proposed at the beginning of the article. The paper also listed 
five recommendations that should be considered if and when Congress 
decides to enact a broad privacy statute. It seems that privacy is 
becoming a burning issue in America, and that is a good thing. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1964, Bob Dylan, an iconic folk singer, wrote and recorded 
the song, The Times They Are a-Changin’.423 It was a song about the 
turmoil that was altering the face of America in the 1960s. In 2021, in 
terms of privacy and biometric privacy, the times are also changing, 
and rapidly at that. Three states have passed general privacy laws 
protecting personal information, while three other states now have 
statutes regarding protecting biometric data privacy. Many states are 
currently considering bills that address the privacy concerns of their 
constituents. With all of this activity regarding privacy at the state 
level, what is conspicuous by its absence is a comprehensive federal 
privacy law that addresses protecting individual personal information 
and safeguards the privacy of a person’s biometric information. 
The purpose of this study was to understand and evaluate the 
privacy and property issues that States confront that are inherent within 
the use and results of using biometrics to enhance corporate security in 
their efforts to protect individual privacy. The recommendations from 
this research indicated that what is needed in the United States is a 
comprehensive privacy statute that protects personal information and 
biometric information. The CCPA, as amended by the CPRA, and 
Illinois’ BIPA, can form the basis of a model federal law. Although the 
path traveled to reach this destination is fraught with crossroads, forks 
in the road, and the ever-present obstacles, the goal is worth pursuing. 
For, in the end, the journey will be worth the struggle. Americans want 
and need a privacy law, for they are the owners of their personal and 
biometric information, just as Justice Gorsuch opined in Carpenter. 
The world is rapidly changing, and what is all the rage today may be 
abandoned tomorrow. An inclusive and far-reaching federal privacy 
law is essential to protect the privacy rights of American citizens. 





      
423 BOB DYLAN, THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 
1964). 
